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With the completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations,
attention turns to plausible next steps. One question on the agenda ofpossibilities is
the adoption ofcompetition policies that complement or substitute for the remedies
traditionally used to deal with international trade distortions. This paper examines
three cases -- industrial diamonds, potash from Saskatchewan, and cement from
Greece -- in which international trade policy and competition policy objectives came
into direct conflict. Existing,institions were unable to resolve the conflicts on a timely
basis. A proposed augmentation ofthe World Trade Organization's functions to deal
with such cases is considered.
• Paper presented at a conference on Competition Policies For an Integrated World Economy,
Oslo, Norway, June 13, 1996.1 Introduction
Since the ratification ofthe GATT agreement in 1947-48 and the several rounds of
tariff reductions that followed it, there has been a remarkable expansion of
international trade. Foreign direct investment has grown even more rapidly, letting
business enterprises have an immediate competitive presence not only in their home
territories but also in numerous other nations' markets. The 1995 Treaty of
Marrakech, finalizing the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations,
extended the compass of GATT to agriculture, some service industries, intellectual
property, and significant facets offoreign direct investment.
After the Uruguay Round negotiations were concluded at Geneva in December 1993,
attention turned to unfinished items on the agenda for deeper integration of the
world's economies. Four have gained pride ofplace: environmental protection rules,
labor standards, continuing liberalization oftrade in services, and competition policy.
This paper explores the rationale for measures to harmonize and/or integrate
competition policies across national boundaries. l
The principal function ofcompetition policy is to keep markets open and undistorted
by monopolistic practices, thereby satisfying three more fundamental goals: fostering
an alloc~tion ofresources that best satisfies consumer demands, sustaining pressure
on business enterprises to run a taut ship and innovate, and pennitting market
participants to pursue the opportunities that maximize their individual productive and
creative potential.
2 Monopolistic Distortions ofInternational Trade
The exercise of monopoly power that spills over across national boundaries can
distort international trade in numerous ways. Buyer cartels and vertical restraints that
constrict distribution channels against imported goods have effects directly analogous
to the import tariffs which repeated GATT rounds have sought to dismantle.2 Seller
cartels and, the exercise ofunilateral monopoly power in international trade introduce
distortions essentially equivalent to those associated with export tariffs. Here one
encounteres an interesting asymmetry. Import tariffs have been imposed almost
ubiquitously upon international trade, whereas export tariffs are rare. This asymmetry
is probably explained by the relative ease with which cartelization can be substituted
1 There is ofcourse a vast literature on this subject to which justice cannot be done here. This
paper is based loosely on my own contribution, Competition Policies for an Integrated World
Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994).
2 On the latter, see my "Retail Distribution Channel Bamers to International Trade," forthcoming
in the proceedings ofa November 1995 Columbia University School ofLaw conference on The
Multilateral Trade Regime in the 21st Century.for export tariffs as an instrument ofnational policy and by the skill ofmonopolistic
interest groups in persuading legislators to let cartel rents be captured by the cartel
members, whose efforts can be said to create the rents, rather than by the general
public fisc. When monopolies and cartels extend their reach across multiple nations,
their discriminatory pricing and the re-exportation restrictions they impose upon
middlemen can frustrate arbitrage and prevent the law ofone price from operating. A
firm or group ofjointly-acting oligopolists with monopoly power in the home market
but facing competition abroad has incentives to dump the output from surplus
capacity in foreign markets -- a traditional bugaboo ofinternational trade policy.
The responses authorized under GATT to dumping that injures target nation
industries engender further conflicts between competition policy and international
trade policy. A common remedy for dumping (and also in export subsidy cases) is to
negotiate with the offending exporters a voluntary restraint agreement (VRA), under
which the exporters agree to raise their prices and/or reduce their export volume.
Raising prices and restricting output are the classic behavioral traits ofmonopolists.
When multiple sellers consent to such export restraints, they must find some way to
divide up shares oftheir reduced output and to prevent chiseling from agreed-upon
prices -- in other words, to form what amounts to an export cartel. Or ifthe firms do
not assume these collective responsibilities, the government of the exporting nation
must step in as de facto cartel master.3
3 . The Internationalization ofCompetition Policy
As international trade and investment have grown, so also has the acceptance by the
world's nations ofactive competition policies, national and (to a much more limited
degree) international.
At the end ofWorld War II a halfcentury ago, only one nation -- the United States --
had a pro-competition policy that was enforced assiduously. A few nations such as
Canada and Australia had competition laws analogous to those ofthe United States,
but they were scarcely enforced. Other nations had laws that generally permitted
cartels but subjected them to weak regulatory oversight in the hope of inhibiting
abuses. The first strengthened postwar competition laws were imposed upon
defeated Germany and Japan by the occupying powers. In Japan, this forced move in
a new and unfamiliar direction engendered a reaction that left the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission unpopular and largely ineffective·during the first two decades of its
existence. A similar reaction might have been expected in Germany, but one of
3 On the important and controversial case ofdynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs), see
Kenneth Flamm, Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and the Semiconductor Industry
(Washington: Brookings, 1996). Many other examples exist. On the European experience, see
Patrick A. Messerlin, "The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal,"
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 125 (1989), pp. 563-587.
2history's accidents intervened. Prominent in the first democratically elected German
government were members ofthe liberal Freiburg School, who believed passionately
in free market processes, in part as an antidote to the traditions ofgovernment control
and business-government collaboration that had supported fascism under Hitler. As a
result, a fairly tough anti-cartel law was passed in 1957 and enforced with great
seriousness, if not always with adequate resources, by the newly-organized
Bundeskartellamt. England, which had long pursued a laissez faire policy toward
cartels, feared that monopolistic price-raising could interfere with achieving full
employment after the war. In 1948 it established a Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission to perform investigative and advisory functions. In 1956 a
Restrictive Practices Court with the power to prohibit cartels was created. To the
surprise ofmany, its first decisions took a rather strong anti-cartel line.
An even more important step occurred with the formation ofthe European Common
Market. _As tariff barriers were reduced within the Common market, anti-dumping
mechanisms were phased out beginning in 1970. But to ensure that trade among
Common Market member nations was not distorted, an active competition policy was
considered necessary. As an EC commissioner stated in the 1961 debate over a draft
regulation implementing a competition policy:4
It is ... peyond dispute -- and the authors ofthe Treaty [ofRome] were fully aware
of this -- that it would be useless to bring down the trade barriers between the
member states if the governments or private industry were to remain free through
economic or fiscal legislation, through subsidies or cartel-like restrictions on
competition, virtually to undo the opening ofthe markets and to prevent, or at least
unduly to delay, the action needed to adapt them to the Common Market.
To guard against this danger, the Treaty ofRome included strong language declaring
inconsistent with the common market inter-firm agreements and concerted practices
likely to affect trade between member states. Also prohibited were abuses of
dominant 'market positions affecting trade between member states. After the slow
start that seems typical of virtually all new competition laws, enforcement became
increasingly vigorous. Formal mechanisms for restraining large competition-impeding
mergers within the Common Market were added in 1990. As time passed, all
Common Market member nations (excepting Luxembourg) and affiliated European
Free Trade Association member nations have seen fit to pass their own internal
competition laws.
4 Speech by Hans von der Groeben, quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Antitrust Developments in the European
Common Market (USGPO: 1963), p. 96.
3These developments have been widely emulated, and as a result, most nations within
the industrialized and rapidly industrializing world and many fragments ofthe fonner
Soviet Union have adopted pro-competition laws, which have been enforced with
widely varying consistency, competence, and enthusiasm.
In addition to the harmonization of policies achieved within the European
Community, the compass of competition policy has been extended across national
borders in several ways.
Perhaps most important thus far, individual nations have reached out to attack under
their domestic competition laws restrictive practices (such as export and import
cartels) pursued by foreign-based business enterprises whose effects spilled over
national boundaries, especially when the perpetrating finns had local branch offices
from which evidence could be subpoenaed and assets that could be seized in payment
of fines and other penalties.' These exercises of "extraterritorial jurisdiction," led
initially by the United States, have triggered angry defensive reactions from some
nations within which the target enterprises resided. Nevertheless, they appear to have
gained increasing acceptance as a policy instrument following a successful European
Community prosecution against an international wood pulp cartel5 and a similar case
against a Japanese cartel by Canada,6 which had previously protested vigorously a
U.S. action against a cartel exporting uranium yellowcake to the United States from
its Canadian base.7
To mitigate the hostility that extraterritorial cases can provoke and to increase the
effectiveness of domestic competition policies toward international business
activities, individual nations and trading blocs have negotiated agreements to
cooperate in the mutual pursuit of competition policy actions. One of the first was
between the United States and West Germany, initiated in 1976. Since then
cooperation agreements have been signed inter alia between the United States and
Australia (1982), the United States and Canada (1984), France and Germany (1987),
Australia and New Zealand (1990), and the United States and the European
Community (1991). The EC-US agreement calls for information exchanges, mutual
5 A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio et al. v. Commission ofthe European Communities, 1988 E.C.R. 5193
(1988).
6 See "Canadian Court Fines Japanese Firm $900,000 for Anticompetitive Conspiracy," Antitrust
and Trade Regulation Report, November 25, 1993, pp. 691-692.
7 The Canadian cartel was in effect a restriction against a restriction, since U.S. law prohibited the
sale within the United States of uranium imported to the United States from Canada for
enrichment (a process on which the United .States had a dominant free world position). Thus,
the enriched Canadian uranium had to be re-exported.
4assistance in enforcement actions, and the exercise of.comity in potential enforcement
action conflicts without obliging cooperation whenthe interests ofthe parties diverge.
Over the past halfcentury there have been sporadic attempts, thus far unsuccessful, to
harmonize and perhaps to enforce competition policies on a world-wide plane. The
first significant effort was embodied in the draft Havana Charter treaty of1948, which
would have made a new International Trade Organization (ITO) responsible for
promulgating tariff reductions, arbitrating international trade disputes, and fostering
adherence to international competition policy rules. On the competition policy
dimension, the Havana Charter stipulated that8
Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with the [ITO] to
prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices
affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or
foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the
expansion of production or trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the
other objectives [ofthe Charter].
The Havana Charter treaty was not ratified -- in no small measure because the U. S.
Congress viewed it as too great an infringement on American sovereignty. Its
provision~ for tariffreduction and a mechanism for adjudicating dumping and subsidy
disputes in international trade were carved out and embodied in the GATT system.
Several subsequent efforts to adopt multinational competition policy codes and
institutions to enforce them have met with equally little success. However, proposals
continue to be brought forward -- one by myself,9 and another ofwhich is described
in Professor Immenga's contribution to the conference proceedings.
Is the time now ripe for bolder steps toward the world-wide harmonization of
competition policies and the creation of institutions to adjudicate cross-border
competition policy disputes? With the continuing growth of international trade and
investment and completion ofthe Uruguay Round, competition policy moves toward
the top ofthe agenda ofstill-unsettled but important issues. But objections remain on
at least three counts. For one, although there has been considerable convergence of
national competition policies, huge differences remain between nations in both the
substance and philosophical foundations ofnational laws. These differences might be
seen as a positive reason for harmonization. But if harmonization is attempted, the
differences testify, the task will not be an easy one. Second, some participants in the
debate, including the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, argue that the progress
8 U.S. Department ofState, Havana Charter for an Inter-national Trade Organization, March 24,
1948.
9 Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, Chapter 5.
5made toward harmonization through the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
bilateral cooperation treaties is sufficient to solve the most pressing problems. Third,
unwillingness to cede national sovereignty to supra-national organizations in matters
as important as conduct codes for business enterprise is a serious and perhaps
insuperable obstacle. The sovereignty issue is particularly sensitive in the United
States, both because the United States is jealous of its leading role in world affairs,
and because the real or perceived impact of foreign competition on the wages and
welfare ofmany American workers, especially less-skilled workers, has evoked much
anxiety.
Having only one vote and at best a faint voice to cry out in the wilderness, I can do
nothing about the reluctance of nations, including my own, to accept possible
infringements on their sovereignty. I therefore devote the remainder ofthis paper to
questioning the second argument against multinational measures: that existing
extraterritorial enforcement efforts, leavened through bilateral cooperation
agreements, suffice to eliminate the most important monopoly distortions to
international trade. I advance my argument through three case studies of important
recent cases in which existing institutions failed: the industrial diamond case, the
Canadian potash case, and the European cement case.
4 Industrial Diamond Price-Setting
The international diamond cartel, orchestrated by the De Beers - Oppenheimer
organizations, has been one of the most durable and successful cartels in world
history.1O Despite new entry by Russian, Indian, and Australian producers, the cartel
has maintained remarkable control over the prices of jewel-grade diamonds. Its
influence on the price of industrial-grade diamonds has been less complete, in part
because attempting to control the sales oflower-quality stones could overstrain even
the substantial fmancial resources ofthe De Beers group, and partly because synthetic
diamonds -- produced using a process pioneered by General Electric -- compete with
natural stones.
During the 1990s, General Electric and De Beers together controlled 80 to 90 percent
of the world's industrial diamond supply. In December 1991, with a recession
affecting much of the world economy, putting downward pressure on industrial
diamond prices, General Electric announced synthetic diamond price increases of
10 See Stefan Kanter, The Last Empire: De Beers, Diamonds and the World (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 1993); Edward J. Epstein, The Rise and Fall ofDiamonds (New Yark: Simon
& Schuster, 1982); David E. Koskoff, The Diamond World (New York: Harper & Row, 1981);
Godehard Lenzen, Prokuktions- und Handelsgeschichte des Diamanten (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1966) (English translation, London: Praeger, 1970); and Debra Spar, "The
International Diamond Cartel," John F. Kennedy School of Government case study CI5-89-
878.0, Harvard University (1989).
6approximately 12 percent. The price adjustments were essentially followed by De
Beers in February 1992. In November of 1991 Edward Russell, the manager of
General Electric's synthetic diamond production unit in Ohio, was fired. He claimed
in a law suit that he was dismissed for complaining to General Electric's top
management that members ofthe General Electric diamond sales organization were
violating the U.S. antitrust laws through meetings with, and the transmission of
advance pricing information to, De Beers representatives in Europe. General Electric
asserted in reply that it had fired Russell because of his poor performance, even
though, the evidence showed, it had awarded Russell a substantial salary increase
shortly before the firing.ll
Evidence in a U.S. government antitrust suit against General Electric revealed that
General Electric employees had in fact discussed the stabilization of prices with
officials of De Beers affiliates in Europe and had provided information on
conte~plated price increases to them.l2 There were, however, two serious
weaknesses in the government's case.
First, the key person on the De Beers side of the communi~cations was a French
citizen, Philippe Liotier. However, M. Liotier's connection with De Beers was, to say
the least, organizationally complex.13 Liotier held several jobs. He was managing
director ofthe Diamant Boart, a diamond purchase and sales intermediary, which was
owned by an organization whose board of directors (on which Liotier also served)
had three De Beers members, and which shared ownership 50-50 with De Beers in
UHPU (Ultra High Pressure Units), the company manufacturing synthetic diamonds
in Europe for De Beers. In another ofhis directorships, Liotier reported to Viscount
Etienne Davignon (previously commissioner of the European Community for
industrial policy), who sat on the board of still another De Beers affiliate.14 The
question on which the U.S. Antitrust Division's case foundered was whether, in his
communications with General Electric over prices and impending price changes,
Liotier was serving as representative of the Diamant Boart, a buyer of industrial
diamonds from General Electric and De Beers, or as a representative ofthe De Beers
interests as sellers ofindustrial diamonds. Ifhe represented buyer interests only, the
11 "For GE, A Time Bomb In Ohio?" Business Week, February 14, 1994, p. 30.
12 U. S. v. General Electric Co. et aI., CCH 1994-2 Trade Cases, para. 70,806 (December 1994).
13 For an chart showing some of the complex interrelation-ships among De Beers affiliates, see
"The Oppenheimer Empire," The Economist, July 1, 1989, p. 60.
14 Davignon participated with Liotier in a meeting with General Electric employees on February 12,
1991, at which a General Electric executive suggested to Davignon that GE's European sales
·head and Liotier could work together to help "stabilize prices."
7discussions were not subject to antitrust prosecution; but if he represented seller
interests, they violated the law.
The U.S. government's second problem was that three individuals who could have
been representing De Beers interests in the discussions with General Electric
personnel were European citizens who could not be compelled to provide testimony
on the nature and intent oftheir representations. Belgian authorities cooperated with
the United States in searching the premises of the Diamant Boart in Brussels for
relevant documents in November 1993, but the evidence produced in this way was
inconclusive. An American citizen who worked for Diamant Boart was subpoenaed
during a trip to the United States for grand juiy testimony. He testified again as a
witness for General Electric, but the two sets of testimony were contradictory and
therefore given little weight by the trial court. Without live testimony from the other
individuals linked to De Beers, the Antitrust Division could not prove that those
individuals were orchestrating a horizontal price-fixing scheme and not merely
securing information useful to diamond buying organizations. Therefore, the
government's case was dismissed.
Discussing the government's defeat in what it had proclaimed to be a major
extraterritorial antitrust initiative, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno acknowledged
that the government suffered from "some difficulties in obtaining documents."I5 She
added, however, that only a few weeks earlier President Clinton had signed into law
the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, which would permit
U.S. antitrust agencies to share confidential information with competition policy
authorities overseas.16 The new law, Attorney General Reno predicted in her
commentary on the General Electric case, would help in the development ofevidence
for similar future cases.
Here a note of skepticism must be injected. Foreign competition policy authorities
are likely to cooperate in the provision ofevidence only when it is in their interest to
do so. The De Beers organization, like many multinational enterprises, has affiliates
in many nations. Its operations are relatively footloose. It has chosen to locate key
subsidiaries in nations with a demonstrated willingness to tolerate its cartel activities.
It is known for its alacrity in punishing diamond cutters who fail to exhibit the
expected degree ofcooperation with the cartel, providing to them only diamonds of
IS "General Electric Is Exonerated of Industrial Diamond Price Fixing," Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Report, vol. 67 (December 15, 1994), p. 696. See also U.S. Department ofJustice,
Antitrust Division, Opening Markets and Protecting Competition for America's Business and
Consumers, March 27, 1996, p. 3.
16 "Clinton Signs Bill To Help Enforcers Obtain Foreign-Located Antitrust Evidence," Antitrust &
Trade Regulation Report, vol. 67, November 10, 1994, pp. 568-569. The Congressional
committee reports on that bill can be found in the samejournal, October 13, 1994, pp. 448-453.
8inferior quality, or sometimes, no supplies at all.17 Would one national cartel
authority assist another nation's authority in a competition policy case when the
subject enterprise threatens to withdraw its production and employment from the first
nation, or to deprive independent producers in the first nation ofneeded r~w materials
or components? In my opinion, cooperation is unlikely. Courage in such matters is
almost as scarce as gem-quality diamonds.
5 Canadian Potash
Potassium is an essential nutrient for plant growth. Its application as a fertilizer
component is particularly important in the cultivation ofhigh-yielding com, soybean,
and wheat varieties. Among the naturally occurring mineral salts and oxides of
potassium (generically called potash) that can be applied as fertilizers, the most
common is potassium chloride, which is extracted from sedimentary deposits laid
down ages ago when oceans receded from the earth's surface and also from high-salt
lakes such as the Dead Sea and America's Great Salt Lake.
The Canadian province Saskatchewan is the OPEC ofworld potash markets. Its vast
sedimentary deposits of potassium chloride comprise nearly half of known and
extractible world reserves, and in recent years, it has originated roughly a fourth of
total wo~ld potash supplies.18 Russia has reserves almost as large as those of
Saskatchewan, but as in crude oil, the inefficiency of its mines and transportation
network allows it to export a disproportionately small fraction of its production
potential. Within Saskatchewan during the late 1980s, six companies produced
nearly all ofthe province's output. The largest ofthese was the Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan (PCS), an enterprise owned by the government ofSaskatchewan. The
other leading producers were privately owned. An export cartel, Canpotex, brokered
sales and set prices for potash exported to parts ofthe world (especially Asia) other
than the United States. Because ofU.S. antitrust laws, Canpotex did not participate
in marketing potash to U.S. customers.
During the mid 1980s, PCS sought to increase its share ofa stagnant North American
potash market, thereby utilizing its substantial excess capacity and employing
additional Saskatchewan workers, by cutting prices to selected U.S. customers.
17 See Spar, "International Diamond Cartel (B)," pp. 2-5.
18 See e.g. Bruce W. Wilkinson, "The Saskatchewan Potash Industry and the 1987 US
Antidumping Action," Canadian Public Policy, vol. 15 (February 1989), pp. 145-161; Valerie 1.
Picketts, Andrew Schmitz, and Troy Schmitz, "Rent Seeking: The Potash Dispute between
Canada and the United States," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 73 (May
1991), pp. 255-265; and David G. Haglund and Alex von Bredow, U.S. Trade Barriers and
Canadian Minerals: Copper, Potash and Uranium (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for Resource
Studies, 1990), Chapter 3.
9Other members ofthe Saskatchewan oligopoly responded in kind, leading to a price
war and losses ofmore than $100 million (Canadian) by PCS in 1986. The sharp
reduction in prices spread to the potash producers of New Mexico, who mined
severely depleted reserves at high cost to supply 10 percent of u.S. potash
requirements. On February 10, 1987, two New Mexico companies filed a petition
with the U.S. Department of Commerce accusing the Saskatchewan industry of
dumping potash in the United States. While the Department of Commerce was
collecting data to ascertain the extent to which prices were below "fair market value,"
the U.S. International Trade Commission ruled preliminarily on March 23, 1987, that
U.S. potash producers had been materially injured by Canadian imports.
At about the same time, the government of Saskatchewan fired the top management
ofPCS and installed new leaders hired away from a privately owned potash producer.
The new management was given explicit instructions to cease its price-cutting and to
restore PCS to profitability, among other things to enhance the province's severance
tax revenues and-to secure a higher sale price in the planned future privatization of
PCS. PCS began to assert its traditional price leadership upward from the $29-35
range in which prices had hovered during 1986. See Figure 1, which traces average
f.o.b. mine list prices per short ton ofgranular potash (in U.S. dollars) for shipments
from Saskatchewan to North American customers.19 Year markers are placed at the
beginning of each year. The first vertical dotted line marks the filing of a dumping
action against Saskatchewan producers and the second vertical line the lTC's
preliminary injury determination.
On August 21, 1987, the U.S. International Trade Admin-istration announced
preliminary dumping margins against the leading Saskatchewan producers ranging
from 9 to 85 percent, including a 52 percent margin for PCS and a weighted industry
average margin of37 percent. The decision is marked by the third vertical dotted line
in Figure 1. Industry members would be required to post bonds on all future sales in
the amount oftheir preliminarily assessed dumping margins. PCS had tried to reduce
its ultimate dumping margin liability by leading a substantial price increase in June.
Two weeks after the preliminary dumping margins were announced, it addedoa further
$35 per ton surcharge. to its prices to cover the bonds that would have to be posted,
accompanying its announcement with a statement that the increase would be
rescinded ifdumping margins did not have to be paid. Other producers followed its
lead, and potash prices soared. See again Figure 1. )
19 The data are drawn from weekly surveys published in the Green Markets trade newsletter and
compiled in an expert report by Andrew M. Rosenfield, submitted September 18, 1995, in the
Potash Antitrust Litigation. Actual average transaction prices are often lower than list prices. In
1986, for example, off-list discounts were as high as $10-15 per ton.
10In addition to the impending imposition of substantial dumping duties, the Canadian
producers were subjected to another constraint. Spurred by the threat ofsubstantial
duties on potash exported to the United States, the Saskatchewan parliament passed
in September 1987 a new law authorizing prorationing ofindividual provincial potash
producers' output ifcircumstances were deemed by the lieutenanf governor to warrant
such a step. Thus, a stand-by cartel mechanism compelled by state action, and
consequently exempt from U.S. antitrust prohibitions, was put in place. The
Saskatch-ewan government was in a position to act swiftly if potash producers' net
(after-duty) price and profit realizations deteriorated.
In the closing days ofDecember, the Saskatchewan potash producers negotiated with
the U.S. government a "suspension agreement" under which each finn committed
itself for five years to sell potash in the United States at prices undercutting its
calculated fair market value by no J!lore than a small fraction. The agreement was
validated on January 8, 1988 (fourth dotted vertical line). Three days later PCS
announced that it would rebate the previous $35 surcharge, at the same time setting a
new f.o.b. list price of$85 (U.S.) per ton. Others followed suit, although there was
considerable discounting ofactual transaction prices below the list prices recorded in
Figure 1. The discounting tended to increase as the potash producers gradually grew
more confident that the dumping duty threat had abated.
During 1993 law firms claiming to represent thousands of U.S. fann supply
cooperatives and other dealers that purchased potash and distributed it to fanners,
either in pure fonn or blended with other fertilizers, filed in federal courts diverse
complaints alleging that the price increases of 1987 were effected conspiratorially in
violation ofthe Shennan Antitrust Act, and seeking substantial treble damages.20 In
August of 1993, 12 such suits brought by various collections ofplaintiffgroups were
consolidated into a single class action suit before the U.S. federal district court in
Minneapolis. At the time this paper was written, the responsible judge was weighing
pending summary judgment motions.
As a participant in the proceedings, I have attempted to report the historical facts with
as little embellishment as possible. Now I add my interpretation, to be taken with the
appropriate grain of potass,ium (not sodium) chloride. Although the change in pes
management would probably have led to a cessation ofthe price war, it seems almost
certain that prices would not have been raised along the steep trajectory shown in
Figure 1 had there been no anti-dumping action by the United States government.
Given Saskatchewan's powerful position as the dominant source of potash to the
United States and the dependence of the government on revenue from price-
20 Potash Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 981, U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota, Third Division. The author has served and continues to serve as consultant and
expert witness for Kalium Chemicals, a leading Saskatchewan potash producer.
11dependent potash severance taxes, state-induced price increases would have been in
the provincial government's interest even without anti-dumping threats from the
United States. But the anti-dumping action was clearly a precipitating impetus,
leading the government ofSaskatchewan to take legislaltive action that it had not seen
fit to take during the preceding 18 years.21 As such, it represents a serious failure of
harmonization between international trade policies and international competition
policies, left lUlfesolved inter alia by a subsequent free trade agreement between the
United States and Canada. The treble damages suit by potash merchants is a further
case of failed policy coordination. A better resolution of such conflicts is critically
needed.
6 European Community Cement and "the GreekProblem"
On November 30, 1994, the European Community Commission levied against 42
portland cement producers and their trade associations the largest collection offines,
totalling EGU 248 million, ever assessed under Article 85 ofthe Treaty ofRome.22
The Commission's decision, which is being appealed before EC judicial authorities,
concluded that cement producers had engaged in numerous collusive understandings
aimed at limiting cement shipments across national borders within the Community.
Many of the arrangements castigated in the EC decision cannot detain us here. I
focus on one facet ofthe allegations, involving the so-called "Greek problem."
During the 1970s Greek cement producers added seven million tons of annual
cement-making capacity, nearly doubling their combined capacity, largely to serve the
exploding demand for construction materials from Middle Eastern oil-producing
nations enriched by the increase in oil prices from $3 to $34 per barrel between 1973
and 1981. As oil prices subsequently eroded and then collapsed in 1985 and 1986,
the Middle Eastern demand for cement fell sharply. Greek producers were left with
capacity to produce 16.2 million metric tons of cement per year, far in excess of
domestic consumption (6.1 million tons). Cement prices in Greece (kept down in part
by government price controls and subsidies) were much lower than in other EC
nations. See Figure 2. Important EC markets could be reached easily by water
transportation from production sites on the sea coast ofGreece. The Greek producers
began positioning themselves to ship substantial quantities ofcement to Italy, France,
21 In 1969 the Saskatchewan government implemented output quotas and floor price controls in
response to depressed market conditions, but that action was declared to be unconstitutional by
the Canadian High Court. The 1987 law was carefully drafted to take advantage ofsubsequent
changes in the Canadian constitution and to avoid provisions rendering the 1969 actions
vuinerable to judicial rebuke.
22 Commission Decision under Cases IV/33.126 and 33.322, reported in the Official Journal ofthe




and (especially) the United Kingdom, where prices were held at high levels under the
umbrella ofa cartel that had escaped censure by Britain's Restrictive Trade Practices
Court.
Other European cement producers were alanned over the threat of rapidly rising
Greek penetration into their home markets. At a series ofmeetings during mid-1986,
representatives ofthe leading British, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and (non-EC)
Swiss companies discussed a portfolio of "carrot" and "stick" actions to deal with
countries "who disrupt by exporting surplus tonnage."23 Most of the "stick"
measures, such as penalizing customers who purchased Greek cement,
counterattacking with exports to Greece, triggering price wars in remaining Greek
export markets, and boycotting shipping companies that transported Greek cement,
proved to be infeasible. However, a proposed "carrot" measure -- purchasing excess
cement from the Greek producers and channelling it to markets outside the European
Community -- was implemented. Northern European enterprises entered into bilateral
arrangements with the principal Greek producers to purchase substantial amounts of
cement from them, disposing of it in ways that caused minimal disruption to the
buyers' home markets. Whether these purchases, which resembled the "dancing
partner" arrangements orchestrated by U.S. petroleum refiners during the 1930s,24
were carried out individually, or as part of a concerted scheme, will probably be
contested ~ appeals before the European Court ofJustice. It is also unclear whether
a quid pro quo for the purchases was an agreement by Greek producers to restrain the
export ofadditional cement into Northern Europe and Italy. What is clear is that the
purchases and their disposal were discussed by the multi-company "European Task
Force" and were effected by leading producers. Some ofthe cement acquired in this
way was resold through the buyers' normal distribution networks within the
Community and some was exported to Egypt, West Africa, the Bahamas, and
Canada. The "first priority" target, however, was said at a June 1986 meeting to be
the United States,25 and beginning in July of 1986, the first ofnumerous substantial
shipments moved from Greece through a Northern European middleman to the United
States. Deliveries of Greek cement in the United States rose steadily from zero in
1984 to a peak of2.27 million short tons in 1988 before declining, first gradually and
then sharply.26
23 Commission Decision, p. 57 (quoting a paper, "Collective Response to Problems Posed by
Destabilizing Cement Industry," drafted at a June 3-5, 1986, meeting in Zurich).
24 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et aI., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
25 Commission Decision, p. 70.
26 "Cement Imports, by Country of Ori~in," Construction Review, October 1990, p. viii.
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fur Wettwirtsehaft Kia'As the first Greek shipments arrived, the United States was experiencing booming
demand for cement, causing domestic mills to operate at virtually full capacity while
leaving a growing gap to be filled by imports (which rose from 10.3 percent ofU.S.
consumption in 1984 to 18.7 percent in 1987).27 Thus, the additional cement from
Greece helped alleviate a tight market situation. Its entry into the U.S. market was
facilitated by the fact that in 1986, 53 percent ofall U.S. cement-making capacity was
owned by foreign firms -- most ofit by firms that were meeting to discuss the Greek
problem in Europe.28 The l).K.'s Blue Circle group, Ciments Francais and Lafarge
of France, Holderbank of Switzerland, and Heidelberger of Germany all owned
substantial cement mills near the U.S. eastern seaboard and were therefore in a
position to work the imports from Greece into their normal distribution systems. The
first purchases ofGreek cement were at f.o.b. prices in the range of$27-29 per metric
ton. Since the dollar was trading at near parity to the ECU at the time, and since
(subsidized) Greek home prices were approximately ECU 36 per ton (see Figure 2),
the origin price~ were at dumping levels. The Greek imports induced a reduction of
U.S. prices, but not enough to trigger the second criterion for actionable dumping
under GATT -- material injury.29 Plants located in eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and on the Hudson River reallocated their shipments away from coastal cities and
toward the west, while coastal locations were served to an increasing extent through
Greek imports. Thus, international trade with third-party nations was very clearly
affected by arrangements implemented to reduce competition within the European
Community. Whether, given the tight market situation in the United States, trade can
be said to have been distorted is debatable. The most one can say is that ifthe Greek
producers had tried to sell an equivalent amount of cement in the United States
without moving it through the friendly hands ofNorthern European dancing partners,
they almost surely would have had to do so at lower, more disruptive, prices. And at
lower prices, more Greek cement would have displaced cement from the highest-cost
U.S. mills.
Between 1985 and 1991, annual cement consumption in twelve member nations of
the European Community grew by nearly 30 percent,30 In the United States, the
27 For comparative consumption, capacity, and output data, see Michele D'Ercole and Claudio
Fortuna, "Industrial Restructuring, Regulation and Competition: the Cement Sector in the
Triad," paper presented at a conference on Economic and Corporate Restructuring in
Maastricht, September 1995.
28 See Bruce T. Allen, "Foreign Owners and American Cement: Old Cartel Hands, or New Kids on
the Block?" Review ofIndustrial Organization, vol. 8 (December 1993), pp. 697-716.
29 Average f.o.b. mill cement prices in the United States were approximately ECU 50 per metric
ton in 1986, ECU 46 per metric ton in 1987, and ECU 45 per ton in 1988. U.S. Bureau ofthe
Census, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States: 1991, pp. 694-695.
30 D'Ercole and Fortuna, "Industrial Restructuring," Figure 1.
141989-91 recession reduced cement demand appreciably. The U.S. international trade
authorities ruled in 1990 that Mexican producers had been dumping their cement in
the United States. In early 1991, Japanese producers, whose domestic cartel
sustained very high prices while keeping out most imports,31 were found to have
been dumping in the United States, and dumping margins of48 to 85 percent were
assessed.32 Itis unclear what relative weights the growth ofEuropean demand, the
temporary slump in U.S. demand, the prosecution of anti-dumping cases against
Mexican and Japanese sources, and the initiation of EC cQmpetition policy
proceedings against cement makers in November 1991, carried in the decline of
Greek exports to the U.S. East Coast. Since the sharpest drop occurred during 1990
and 1991, the EC action seems an improbable cause.
To the extent that the dancing partner arrangement affected the flow ofGreek cement
to the United States (as well as Egypt, Canada, West Africa, and the Bahamas), one
may assume that the EC's competition action thwarted its continuation. During the
several years when the arrangement was active, however, one can conclude again that
arguably anti-competitive activities in one competition policy jurisdiction spilled over
to·affect international trade flows within another jurisdiction. The same conclusion
holds a fortiori with respect to the cartel-induced dumping ofcement from Japan into
the United States and other nations. To the best ofmy knowledge, the U.S. antitrust
enforcers ,were unaware of these influences on their home market, or at least, they
took no enforcement actions against them. It is doubtful whether the European
Community would have acted against its domestic producers had their conduct not
distorted competition within the Community.33 Since the arrangement probably
permitted Greek cement to move to the United States at prices higher than those that
would have been sustainable had Greek producers acted independently, and since it
reduced the risk of anti-dumping countermeasures by the United States, the EC
authorities might rationally have ignored a similar export cartel whose motivation was
less visibly the frustration of intra-EC competition. Here too, therefore, we find a
significant lacuna in the integration ofinternational trade and competition policies.
31 For an analysis of how 'the Japanese cement cartel works, see Mark Tilton, Restrained Trade:
Cartels in Japan's Basic Materials Industries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), Chapter 4.
32 See "ITC Clears Way for Duties on Cement from Japan," Journal ofCommerce, April 25, 1991,
p.4A. .
33 In its November 1994 decision, p. 120, the European Community Commission stated that "The
concerted practice relating to the channelling of production surpluses for export is also
restrictive ofcompetition. Through such practice, members ofthe WCC waived pursuit of an
autonomous commercial policy, setting up a system of solidarity and monitoring aimed at
preventing incursions by competitors on respective national markets within the Community."
157 Conclusion
That such gaps exist, and that they are important, is the broader moral ofthis paper.
Coordination of price changes between General Electric and De Beers affiliates
arguably permitted a counter-cyclical price increase for industrial diamonds sold in
world markets. Under existing institutions, the U.S. antitrust authorities were
powerless to obtain the information they needed to determine what actually happened.
Clumsy anti-dumping actions by the U.S. government forced price increases by
Saskatchewan potash producers and induced the Saskatchewan government to pass a
standby cartelization law with long-term consequences for the supply offertilizer and
hence the supply ofbasic grain products. Until the European Community authorities
intervened to enhance competition within their home jurisdiction, coordinated
producer measures to alleviate "the Greek problem" affected the supply ofPortland
cement into the United States and other nations. It was left to U.S. trade authorities
to act against Japanese dumping that stemmed from ineffective enforcement of the
Japanese anti-monopoly law toward cement producers and their distributors within
the Japanese home market. Surely, there is room for improvement.
Whether improvement will come through more aggressive uni-Iateral enforcement
actions (unsuccessful in the diamond case), better bilateral cooperation (unsuccessful
in all of the cases reviewed here), or (more radical) measures to move toward
multilateral coordination of competition policies remains to be debated and
determined.
In my monograph, Competition Policy for an Integrated World Economy, I advanced
a modest proposal for a transition to multi-lateral coordination under the auspices of
the World Trade Organization. Recognizing the reticence of nations to surrender
their sovereignty and the other difficult problems that would attend such a change,
modesty is essential. If progress is to occur, some important limitations must be
clearly recognized.34
For one, there remain enormous differences across nations in the substance of
national competition policies. Any multilateral accord will have to be on some
limited subset of core principles governing only transactions with significant
implications for international trade and/or investment. The most likely candidates are
export and import cartels, serious abus~s ofdominant positions in the world market,
andmerger approval procedures.
Second, even in these core areas, many nations will be unwilling to go all the way to
a flat prohibition. Brazil is unlikely to surrender its (usually unsuccessful) right to
34 This section is drawn with minor revisions from my paper, "Competition Policy Convergence:
Where Next?" to be delivered at a conference ofthe Austrian Economic Association in Vienna
June 20.
16orchestrate an international coffee cartel, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing
nations their participation (however dispirited of late) in OPEC, Canada its right to
restrain exports of potash, Russia its cooperation with the De Beers diamond
syndicate, and the United States the dominance of Boeing in large turbojet airliner
markets. Thus, exceptions will be necessary. Under my proposal, each nation would
be allowed three four-digit SITC industry exceptions from an otherwise general ban
on export cartels. As experience is gained, the number of exemptions might be
progressively reduced to two and then one per nation.
Third, it must be recognized that historically, a consid-erable time interval passed
before national competition policy enforcement agencies leamed how to do their
work effectively. Seven years elapsed between passage ofthe U.S. Sherman Act and
the first St!preme Court prohibition ofa price-fixing ring; twelve years between the
Treaty ofRome and the first imposition offines against European Community cartels;
eleven years between the creation ofthe U.K. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission and the first prohibition of a cartel by the Restrictive Practices Court;
and 20 years between the post-occupation amendment ofJapan's Anti-Monopoly Law
and a Fair Trade Commission attack on illegal cartels, including the Commission's
first criminal price-fixing indictment.35 Before serious enforcement can proceed,
much learning must occur, and political support must be built. Therefore, I propose
that an international body with competition policy responsibilities begin by confining
its activities to investigation and the publication of informative reports on alleged
border-spanning restrictive practices. Only in the seventh year ofits existence would
I have the agency assume actual enforcement responsibilities.
Finally, even after a considerable shakedown period, an international competition
policy agency would have to tread-warilY, according considerable respect to national
sovereignty. It would use the good offices of national competition authorities to
support its investigations, and it would entrust national authorities with implementing
recommended corrective actions. Only in cases of national intransigence would
conventional WTO enforcement sanctions be set in motion.
This, to repeat, is a modest proposal. Despite that, it may be more than the
community ofnations is willing to swallow. Yet the time when such measures must
be considered seriously h'as arrived. I offer it in that spirit to help focus the debate.
35 Tilton, Restrained Trade, pp. 33-35.
17Figure 1
Movement of Saskatchewan Potash Prices, 1986-1 993
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